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... as we know, there are known knowns; there are things that we know we know. We 
also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things 
we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know 
we don’t know.—Donald Rumsfeld.1 
In 2002, Donald Rumsfeld’s ruminations on the failures of U.S. military intel-
ligence in Iraq won the Plain English Campaign’s annual prize for “most baffling 
remark made by a public figure”—narrowly beating Arnold Schwarzenegger’s “gay 
marriage is something that should be between a man and a woman,” and Chris-
topher Patten’s “having committed political suicide, the Conservative party is now 
living to regret it.”2 I too chuckled at Secretary Rumsfeld’s verbal contortions; but 
I thought he had a point—an epistemological point. 
What that point was will become clear in due course; but first I need to say 
something about what epistemology is, and how it bears on real-world issues. 
Having worked in this field for decades, I find myself calling on epistemological 
ideas almost every day: when I wonder, e.g., what to make of an article claim-
ing that there is empirical evidence showing that adolescents and young adults 
should be given preference over infants and older people in the allocation of scarce 
medical resources; whether “evidence-based medicine” is as obviously desirable 
as its proponents make it sound—and if so, why many people distrust the idea; 
or what lessons to draw from the revelation that the medical scientist whose 
work provoked widespread panic about the supposed dangers of MMR (mumps, 
measles, and rubella) vaccine had doctored his results, or that mainstream climate 
scientists had tried to suppress work dissenting from the majority view; etc., etc. 
You will soon see why.
***
* © 2011 Susan Haack. All requests to reprint, translate, abridge, or adapt the article should be addressed to 
the author, shaack@law.miami.edu.  This paper was first published in Danish, under the title “Erkendelsesteori—
hvem har brug for det?” Kritik 200 (2011): 26-35; and then in Italian translation by Carlo Penco, “Epistemologia: 
Chi Ne Ha Bisogno?” Epistemologia XXXI (2011): 269-88.   
1 Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense under President George W. Bush), Department of Defense news 
briefing, February 12, 2002.
2 “Rumsfeld’s Unknown Unknowns Take Prize,” http://www.buzzle.com.editorials/12-1-03-48150.asp (last 
visited January 4th, 2011). Schwarzenegger was then Governor of California, Patten a recent past chairman 
of the British Conservative Party.
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In 1843, John Stuart Mill wrote that “[t]he business of the magistrate, of the 
military commander, of the physician, of the agriculturalist, is merely to judge of 
evidence, and to act accordingly.”3 He’s right. In fact, we all need to “judge of evi-
dence, and to act accordingly”—in deciding what to eat, whom to trust, whether to 
undergo a suggested medical treatment, etc. We can’t act safely or effectively unless 
we have some idea what is likely to happen if we do this or that; which requires go-
ing with such evidence as we have, or can obtain. Often, also, we need to consider 
the sources of our evidence, and the possibility that it has been impoverished or 
distorted as it was passed along; and to discriminate well- from poorly-conducted 
inquiry—and good-faith efforts to discover the truth from attempts to minimize a 
scandal or frame a convenient suspect. 
Our so-called “Age of Information” is marked, not only by a growing depen-
dence on electronic media and gadgetry for disseminating information, but also by 
an unprecedented flood of information itself; and by a growing sense that social 
policies—on the environment, the economy, public health, education, the justice 
system, international relations, etc.—should be based on knowledge of their ben-
efits, and their costs. It is indeed desirable that social, like individual, decisions be 
informed by whatever we can find out about the likely consequences of doing this 
or that—or doing nothing. We shouldn’t forget, though, that factual information 
alone can’t tell us what policies to adopt: what the costs and benefits are of dam-
ming this river, raising the highest tax-rate by 10%, requiring that all children be 
vaccinated against this disease, or etc., is one thing; whether the benefits outweigh 
the costs is quite another. (Formal cost-benefit analyses, which inevitably presuppose 
evaluative judgments in identifying relevant factors and assigning them weight, 
can’t close the gap.)4 Nor should we forget that acquiring information takes effort 
and, often, money; or that, as the hunger for information grows, not only more 
and more information, but also more and more misinformation becomes available; 
and not only more and more research, but also more and more pseudo-research is 
conducted. It gets harder and harder to sift the good stuff from the dreck. 
Some—perhaps disillusioned by how common pseudo-inquiry is, and how 
often confidently-made claims turn out to be false—profess to have lost confidence 
in the concepts of evidence, truth, inquiry, etc., altogether. Richard Rorty, for one, 
avers that he “do[es] not have much use for the notion of ‘objective truth,’”5 and 
sees “rationality as civility, ... respect for the opinions of those around one, ... [and] 
‘true’ as a word which applies to those beliefs upon which we are able to agree.”6 
But when they decide on medical treatment, choose a flight, or call the bank to 
make sure the check from their publisher has arrived, like everyone else Rorty and 
his fellow-cynics go by the evidence they have or can obtain—revealing that they 
don’t really believe, as they profess, that (as they would say) “so-called ‘truth,’” 
“so-called ‘evidence,’” etc., are pure social convention, with no objective basis.
The discipline to which it falls to articulate what distinguishes genuine inquiry 
from pseudo-inquiry, what makes inquiry better- or worse-conducted, evidence 
stronger or weaker, etc., is the philosophical theory of knowledge, known in the 
trade as “epistemology”—a charmless and off-putting word for what is too often, 
I’m afraid, a charmless and off-putting enterprise. (As journalist Jonathan Rauch 
observed in an acute book on campus speech codes, “[i]f you want to empty the 
3 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of 
Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (1843), 8th ed., London, 1970, p. 5. 
4 See Lawrence Tribe, “Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21, 1972: 66-110. 
5 Richard Rorty, “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids,” Common Knowledge, 1.3, 1992: 140-53, p. 141.
6 Richard Rorty, “Science as Solidarity,” in John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald M. McCloskey, eds, The 
Rhetoric of the Human Sciences, Madison, WI, 1987, 38-52, pp. 44, 40, 45.
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room at a cocktail party,” all you have to do is say “epistemology.”)7 Nevertheless, 
if you want to understand such vital practices as assessing the worth of evidence 
and the quality of inquiry, epistemology is what you need.
I don’t mean to suggest that everyone needs epistemological theory sim-
ply to go about their everyday business. Here is Mill again: “[m]ankind judged of 
evidence, and often correctly, before [epistemology] was a science, or they never 
could have made it one.”8 Again, he’s right. Usually we can assess the worth of 
evidence well enough without giving it much sustained thought, or needing any 
epistemological theory. But such theory can be genuinely helpful when evidence 
is complex or ambiguous, or the subject-matter so emotionally colored that we 
are in danger of losing our cool—as often happens in courts of law, in politics, on 
medical and public-health issues, on environmental questions and, yes, in matters 
of military intelligence.   
I don’t mean to suggest, either, that only the work of professional epistemolo-
gists can be of use; there are epistemological insights in the work of legal scholars, 
historians, and scientists, etc.: e.g., mathematician W. K. Clifford’s shrewd observa-
tion that “the credulous man is father to the liar and the cheat”;9 and physicist Percy 
Bridgman’s thought-provoking comment that when “the man [with] an apprecia-
tion and capacity for intellectual integrity” thinks about our social institutions, his 
“inevitable reaction will obviously be a complete repudiation in his own mind of 
the bunk that he is asked to accept.”10 There are epistemological insights, too, in 
works of fiction: e.g., in Scott Turow’s Reversible Errors,11 where a criminal-defense 
attorney handling a last-minute death-penalty appeal uncovers new evidence that 
makes it seem more and more likely that his client is guilty—until he finds one crucial 
piece of evidence that reveals that all the rest was misleading; in Michael Frayn’s 
Headlong,12 where a philosophy lecturer desperately trying to find out whether the 
painting he hopes to buy cheap from his clueless aristocratic neighbor really is, as 
he believed at first glance, a priceless missing Bruegel, uncovers evidence that seems 
to show, yes, that it is—no, that it isn’t—yes, that it is, .... and so on; and in Arthur 
Hailey’s Strong Medicine,13 where a medical scientist wants so badly to believe that 
his new drug is a real breakthrough that, when evidence of dangerous side-effects 
begins to trickle in, he feels justified in suppressing it. 
Nor do I mean to suggest that all the work of professional epistemologists 
will be useful to “the magistrate, the military commander, the physician,” or the 
rest of us, as we struggle with complex or disturbing evidence. As I hinted earlier, 
much contemporary work in epistemology is hermetic and self-absorbed; and 
anyway, work on the definition of “knowledge” or the refutation of skepticism, 
or approaches (like reliabilism or virtue epistemology) that play down the role of 
evidence, are little help with the real-world questions that concern us here.14 What 
7 Jonathan Rauch, Kindly Inquisitors: The New Attacks on Free Thought, Chicago, 1993, p. 35.
8 Mill, System of Logic (note 3), p. 6. (The word Mill uses is not “epistemology,” which at the time had not 
yet come into currency, but “logic,” which, as his subtitle indicates, was then used much more broadly than 
is now usual, to include what would now be called “epistemology.”) 
9 W. K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief” (1876), in Timothy J. Madigan, ed., The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays, 
Amherst, NY, 1999, 70-96, p. 77. See also Susan Haack, “Credulity and Circumspection: epistemological 
Character and the Ethics of Belief,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (2015): 1-21.
10 Percy W. Bridgman, “The Struggle for Intellectual Integrity” (1933), in Bridgman, Reflections of a Physicist, 
New York, 1955, 361-79, p. 368. 
11 Scott Turow, Reversible Errors, New York, 2002.
12 Michael Frayn, Headlong, London and New York, 1999.
13 Arthur Hailey, Strong Medicine, London, 1984.
14 “Social epistemology” is now fashionable; but so far as I can tell, there is as yet no well-developed body 
of theory here. 
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we need is epistemological theory focused on core issues about inquiry, evidence, 
etc.; spelled out in enough detail to deal with evidence of serious complexity; and, 
at least approximately—well, true.
As Nicholas Rescher once observed, “if two people agree, one of them isn’t 
a philosopher.”15 He exaggerates; but not much. What I offer here will be, not the 
epistemological perspective, but my perspective on a battery of key epistemological 
questions: about the difference between pseudo-inquiry and the real thing, about 
evidence and quality of evidence, about how information is transmitted and can 
be distorted, and about expertise. 
***
Genuine inquiry is an attempt to discover the truth of some question. This 
means, not that scientists, historians, etc., seek The Truth, in a quasi-religious sense, 
but that, e.g., a historian investigating whether Thomas Jefferson was the father of 
his house slave’s children wants to end up concluding that Jefferson was the father 
of these children just in case he was their father, and that he wasn’t if he wasn’t 
(and that it’s a lot more complicated than that if it is a lot more complicated than 
that);16 that a scientist investigating global warming wants to end up concluding 
that global warming is man-made just in case global warming is man-made, and 
that it isn’t if it isn’t (and, etc.); and so on.
A serious inquirer will seek out all the evidence he can, and do his best to assess 
whether it warrants this conclusion or that, or is insufficient to warrant any conclu-
sion at all. But someone who already knows what conclusion he intends to reach, 
and is looking for evidence that supports it—and for ways to disguise or play down 
evidence that points elsewhere—isn’t really inquiring; for it is part of the meaning 
of the word “inquire” that you don’t know how things will turn out.17 That’s why, 
when the government or our university launches an Official Inquiry into a disturb-
ing scandal, some of us—suspecting that this “inquiry” will arrive at the desired, 
reassuring conclusion no matter what the evidence—reach for our scare quotes. 
To be sure, people’s motives are usually mixed, so there is a continuum of 
intermediate cases where what is going on is neither pure, disinterested inquiry nor 
outright sham: e.g., a scholar who has obtained a grant on the basis of an over-
optimistic description of what his project will achieve, and fudges his report to avoid 
jeopardizing his prospects for future grant money; a scientist whose inadequate 
records of his work allow him to forget the inconvenient evidence his hypothesis 
can’t explain;18 or a detective whose suspicions have focused prematurely on a single 
suspect, and who shrugs off evidence that might point to others. 
Someone who desperately needs the money may persuade himself that he 
has a good chance of winning the lottery; someone who greatly fears that the 
mole that has appeared on his nose is cancerous may persuade himself that it looks 
worse than it really does. But the hope has no bearing on the likelihood that the 
ticket will win, nor the fear on the likelihood that the mole is malign; our wishes, 
hopes, and fears can affect our judgment of evidence, but they are not themselves 
evidence. Evidence consists, rather, of what we see, hear, etc. (experiential evidence) 
15 Nicholas Rescher, The Strife of Systems, Oxford, 1985, p. 3.
16 DNA evidence indicates that some male of the Jefferson family was the father of one of these children. 
William G. Hyland, In Defense of Thomas Jefferson: The Sally Hemings Sex Scandal, New York, 2009.
17 See Susan Haack, “Confessions of an Old-Fashioned Prig” and “Preposterism and Its Consequences,” in 
Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate: Unfashionable Essays, Chicago, 1998, 7-30, 88-208.
18 According to one study, more than 27% of scientists polled admitted keeping inadequate records.  Brian C. 
Martinson et al., “Scientists Behaving Badly,” Nature, 435.9, 2005: 737-8.
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and background information (reasons); which, as I argued in Evidence and Inquiry,19 
work together rather like clues and already-completed entries in a crossword puzzle. 
Evidence may be better or worse; and whether, and if so, to what degree, a 
claim is warranted depends on how good the evidence is with respect to that claim. 
Reasons ramify, like crossword entries; and what makes evidence better or worse 
is analogous to what makes a crossword entry more or less reasonable: how sup-
portive it is (analogue: how well an entry fits with its clue and already completed 
entries); how secure it is, independent of the claim in question (how reasonable 
the already-completed entries are); and how comprehensive it is, how much of the 
relevant evidence it includes (how much of the crossword has been completed). 
As this third clause reveals, if your evidence is too sketchy, you’re not entitled to 
believe either way—which is no doubt why the English word “partial” has its two 
meanings: “incomplete,” and “biased.” As it also reveals, that we have no evidence 
that p doesn’t mean that we have evidence that not-p.
What evidence is relevant to a claim depends on facts about the world. If 
character really is revealed by handwriting, how a person writes the letter “g” might 
be relevant to whether or not he is honest; but if not, not. If rats are like human 
beings in the relevant respects, what effect this drug has on them is relevant to 
what effect it will have on humans; but if not, not. (Thalidomide was tested on 
pregnant rats with no ill-effects on them, or their offspring; but, though it had a 
strong sedative effect on humans, it had no such effect on the rats. Perhaps if—in-
stead of devising new tests to show that the rats were, really, a bit sedated—they 
had wondered whether there was some relevant physiological difference between 
rats and humans, the Thalidomide tragedy might have been avoided).20 To repeat: 
judging the quality of evidence requires factual knowledge.
Moreover, our evidence is often second-hand:21 e.g., when I choose a flight 
based on information an airline representative gives me; when a scientist reaches a 
conclusion using complicated instruments, or relying on other peoples’ observations 
or statistical calculations, etc.; or when a physician prescribes a treatment relying 
on results published in medical journals, or on what a pharmaceutical-company 
representative tells him about off-label uses for a drug. We rarely think about this 
unless we fear we’ve been let down; but we all depend implicitly on assumptions 
about how reliable these machines, instruments, or people are, how successful this 
scientific journal is at selecting reliable work, how likely a drug-company represen-
tative is to tell the whole truth about the benefits and side-effects of a profitable 
product, or an airline representative to look for all available flights, etc. We can’t get 
by without relying on evidence passed on by others; so we can’t avoid the necessity, 
not only of judging how likely it is that they are telling the truth as they believe it 
to be, but also of judging how adequately they judge the evidence they have.
Even in the most primitive societies, people rely on others’ reports about the 
best place to find game or cross a river, on knowledge passed down from one gen-
eration to the next about the medicinal properties of plants, etc. And in complex 
modern societies we are often obliged, not simply to depend on evidence passed 
on by others, but to rely on the opinions of experts on arcane matters about which 
we know too little to judge for ourselves. If you aren’t familiar with the relevant 
vocabulary, or don’t know the relevant facts, then—like a monolingual Tagalog 
19 Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry (1993); 2nd, expanded ed., Amherst, NY 2009. 
20 The tragic story is told in Trent D. Stephens and Rock Brynner, Dark Remedy: The Impact of Thalidomide and 
Its Revival as a Vital Medicine, Cambridge, MA, 2001.    
21 Social aspects of the theory presented in Evidence and Inquiry (note 19) are developed in my Defending 
Science—Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism, Amherst, NY, 2003, chapter 3. 
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speaker trying to assess the reasonableness of an entry in an English crossword 
puzzle in which all the clues are puns drawn from Shakespeare’s plays—you simply 
can’t judge whether or to what degree the evidence warrants a conclusion. That’s 
why we struggle to distinguish real experts from plausible but untrustworthy 
pseudo-experts, falling back on fallible surrogate measures like the prestige of the 
institution from which a supposed expert got his degree or of the journal in which 
his work was published.
But for all the complexity of modern life, we humans are still—well, only 
human. When we need to look into difficult questions, it is always tempting to 
cut corners; and even with the best will in the world it can be very hard to figure 
out where complex or ambiguous evidence points. And as Denis Diderot long ago 
reminded us, man is made up “of strength and weakness, of insight and blind-
ness, of pettiness and grandeur.”22 Yes, we are capable of remarkable cognitive 
achievements—but too often we are lazy, and jump to conclusions; too often we 
are biased, and ignore or conveniently forget evidence that points to facts we find 
unpalatable; and too often we seize on inadequate evidence that confirms our fears 
or serves our interests.
Scientists, too, are only human, with the same perceptual and cognitive 
weaknesses and limitations as the rest of us, and the same tendencies to corner-
cutting and wishful or fearful thinking. Over time, however, the sciences have 
developed tools to overcome perceptual and cognitive limitations—telescopes, 
microscopes, mathematical and statistical techniques, computer simulation 
methods, etc.; and internal social mechanisms by means of which the natural-
scientific community, at least, has managed to keep most of its members, most 
of the time, reasonably honest—an ethos that rewards real achievement, en-
courages evidence-sharing, and discourages cheating, as well as more formal 
mechanisms like the peer-review process for distributing research funds and 
screening publication.23 
But while those technical scientific tools generally get better and better, the 
social mechanisms keeping scientists honest do not; in fact, they are now under 
severe strain as scientists find themselves ever more urgently required to get grants, 
to publish, etc. And the strain is worst precisely where the scientific work concerned 
is of most public interest: e.g., in climate science and the medical sciences—where 
media reports seize on newsworthy scientific results, but omit important caveats 
and limitations, and politicians seize on those reports to drum up support for their 
policies. It’s hardly surprising that some scientists succumb to the temptation to 
fudge, exaggerate, or even fabricate.24
Much of the scientific work we read about in the press is largely speculative, 
and will probably come to nothing; and on many questions scientific opinion is as 
yet unsettled. We often over-estimate how well we understand arcane, complex 
evidence, and jump to unwarranted conclusions; or under-estimate what we can 
figure out if we try, and throw up our hands in despair, meekly accepting whatever 
any self-styled expert tells us. But when there is unresolved scientific controversy 
in an unfamiliar field, the reasonable response is to acknowledge that you aren’t 
entitled to an opinion; and, by contrast, when, say, a medical study was based, not 
on physicians’ diagnoses, but on patients’ own reports of what was wrong with 
them, you don’t need to be an expert to spot problems.
22 Denis Diderot, Addition aux pensées philosophiques (c. 1762), in The Oxford Book of Aphorisms, ed. John 
Gross, Oxford, 1983, pp. 24-5.  
23 See Defending Science (note 21) chapter 4.
24 Id., chapter 7.
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Here is Mill once more: “[epistemology] does not give ... proofs, but teaches 
what makes them proofs, and how to judge of them.”25 Again, he’s right; epistemo-
logical theory can tell us what makes evidence better or worse, but not whether or 
to what degree a claim is warranted or a scientific study methodologically flawed. 
A crash course in epistemology won’t magically turn you into an expert on every-
thing, nor enable you to assess arcane evidence, spot technical design flaws in a 
scientific study, or discriminate reliable experts from unreliable in an unfamiliar 
field. But (good) epistemology can help you understand what goes wrong when 
your efforts to appraise evidence go awry, when you mistake a charlatan or clever 
self-promoter for a serious inquirer, etc.  
As we have seen, there are many ways to get into epistemological trouble: 
misconstruing what the evidence is, or what is relevant to what; focusing on read-
ily available evidence and forgetting about other potentially relevant evidence we 
don’t have; misjudging how well the evidence we have warrants a conclusion, per-
haps allowing our wishes or our fears to color our judgment; failing to realize that 
information has been lost or distorted in the transmission process, or that those 
on whom we are relying have allowed their judgment of the weight of evidence to 
be colored by their hopes or fears; or simply being reluctant to admit that we were 
mistaken, or that we just don’t know. 
***
With these thoughts in mind, I return to that recent article in a leading British 
medical journal, The Lancet, arguing that there is empirical evidence for allocating 
scarce medical resources to adolescents and young adults rather than infants or 
older people.26 Reading the article itself (rather than just press reports), you soon 
learn that this “evidence” consists of surveys showing that most people think that 
this is how such resources should be allocated. But information about what most 
people think is best can’t possibly tell us what is best. And anyway, digging a little 
deeper, you soon discover that this supposed evidence is far from secure: only two 
studies are cited; one is unpublished, and neither says exactly what the authors of 
the Lancet article claim. 
What about “evidence-based medicine”? This certainly sounds like a good 
thing—who wouldn’t prefer to know before they take it that this medicine will 
make them better, and won’t kill them in the process? And indeed, evidence-based 
medicine is a good thing—if “evidence-based” means “taking into account all the 
relevant evidence we have, or can obtain.” But things go wrong when the entirely 
reasonable idea that we should prefer medical treatment which there is evidence 
to believe is both effective and safe is covertly transmuted into the much less rea-
sonable idea that we should prefer medical treatments supported by a restricted 
kind of evidence—epidemiological studies and clinical trials. This is classic bait-and-
switch: first appeal to our sense that evidence matters, and then covertly allow only 
evidence of certain preferred kinds.
Epidemiological evidence and clinical trials aren’t the only evidence relevant 
to assessing the value of a medical treatment. Information about, e.g., the effects of 
a drug on animals is also relevant; as are physicians’ observations of which patients 
respond well to a treatment, and which badly or not at all—which can comple-
ment the evidence about large classes of people that epidemiological studies and 
25 Mill, System of Logic (note 3), p. 5.
26 Govind Persad, Alan Wertheimer, and Ezekiel J. Emmanuel, “Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical 
Resources,” The Lancet, 373, 2009: 432-32.
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clinical trials provide with evidence of possibly-relevant individual variations. And 
epidemiological studies and clinical trials aren’t always good evidence, either, but 
may be flawed in design, execution, or both. The only epidemiological study to sug-
gest that silicone breast-implants cause connective-tissue disorders relied entirely 
on women’s own reports of their (supposed) medical problems;27 the VIGOR trial, 
on the basis of which Merck got FDA28 approval to market its blockbuster arthritis 
drug Vioxx, was designed to record the gastrointestinal effects of the drug, which 
the company had reason to believe would be benign, for longer than it recorded 
cardiovascular effects29—effects that subsequently proved so bad that the drug had 
to be withdrawn from the market.
A busy physician, if he doesn’t simply rely on what drug-company reps tell 
him, probably reads at most the abstracts of papers in the medical journals; and 
may simply assume that the peer-review process will screen out poor work.30 But 
the referees for the highly prestigious New England Journal of Medicine, where 
the report of the VIGOR trial appeared, didn’t notice the flaw in its design; nor, 
later, did other referees notice that the authors of the APPROVe study, on the basis 
of which the drug was withdrawn, didn’t actually use the statistical methods they 
claimed they did.31 And the breast-implant example illustrates what happens when 
people’s appraisal of evidence is colored by fear: an attention-getting television 
program led many women with silicone implants to worry that the slightest twinge 
was the first sign of serious trouble; and attorneys soon cashed in, signing up scads 
of breast-implant clients.32 
The imbroglio over MMR vaccine and autism is even more disturbing. In 
1998, a scary paper in The Lancet by Dr. Andrew Wakefield et al. suggested that 
this vaccine might cause a new syndrome of bowel disease and autism.33 The press 
soon picked up the story; many parents became afraid to have their children vac-
cinated; and the rate of measles and other preventable children’s illnesses rose.34 
But it should have been clear even to a lay reader that Dr. Wakefield’s study was 
flawed: there were no control subjects; the study was based on only twelve chil-
dren—eight of whom (Wakefield claimed) had developed autism after their MMR 
vaccination; and it relied on what parents could recall about when their children’s 
symptoms first appeared. Critics soon pointed out these and other defects; and 
new epidemiological studies failed to find any correlation between the vaccine 
and autism.35 
27 Charles H. Henneckens et al., “Self-Reported Breast Implants and Connective Tissue Diseases in Female Health 
Professionals,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 275, 1996: 616-621.
28 Food and Drug Administration, the federal regulatory body that determines whether a drug or medical 
device has been proven safe and effective, and may be marketed in the U.S.
29 Claire Bombadier et al., “Comparison of upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib [Vioxx] and Naproxen 
in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis,” New England Journal of Medicine, 343.21, 2000: 1520-28. David 
Armstrong, “How the New England Journal Missed Warning Signs on Vioxx: Medical Journal Waited Years to 
Report Flaws in Article that Praised Pin Drug,” Wall Street Journal, 11 May 2006, A1, A11. 
30 On the peer review system generally, see Haack, “Peer Review and Publication: Lessons for Lawyers,” Stetson 
Law Review, 36.3, 2007: 789-819.
31 Heather Won Tesoriero, “Vioxx Correction May Add Pressure to Merck’s Defense,” Wall Street Journal, 27 
June 2006, p. A2. See also my “The Integrity of Science: What It Means, Why It Matters” (2006), in Putting 
Philosophy to Work: Inquiry and its Place in Culture, Amherst, NY, 2008, pp. 95-127. 
32 See Marcia Angell, Science on Trial: The Clash of Medical Evidence and the Law in the Breast Implant Case, 
New York, 1996. 
33 Andrew Wakefield et al., “Ileal-lymphoid-nodular Hyperplasia, Non-specific Colitis, and Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder in Children,” The Lancet, 351, February 28th, 1998: 637-41. 
34 Editors of the British Medical Journal, “Wakefield Article Linking MMR Vaccine and Autism was Fraudulent,” 
British Medical Journal, 342, 2011: 64-6. (The incidence of measles rose significantly in the U.K. and the U.S.; 
I don’t know what happened elsewhere.)
35 Id.
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In 2004, investigative journalist Brian Deer noted Wakefield’s involvement 
with attorneys for parents suing the vaccine manufacturers, and suggested that his 
study had violated ethical rules.36 The General Medical Council (GMC: the body that 
regulates the medical profession in the U.K.) launched an investigation. And then, 
another twist: in the course of the ethics hearing, the children’s medical records 
were made public; and Deer discovered that in all twelve cases there were significant 
discrepancies between the children’s records and Wakefield’s descriptions: e.g., 
some of the children had shown signs of autism before they were vaccinated, and 
others never had autism at all.37 In short, Wakefield’s work seems to have been, 
not just flawed, but fraudulent. In 2010, the GMC barred Wakefield from practicing 
medicine in the U.K.,38 and The Lancet retracted his paper.39
Thee twelve other medical scientists whose names appeared on Wakefield’s 
paper as co-authors—perhaps over-anxious to add to their résumés—had lent their 
authority to a final version of the paper that, in fact, Wakefield wrote alone; and 
Robin Horton, the editor of The Lancet, was apparently too keen to make a splash: 
four of six referees had advised him to reject Wakefield’s paper, but he accepted it 
anyway, thinking it “provocative.”40 The Vioxx saga reminds us that the peer-review 
process is a very fallible quality-control mechanism; the MMR vaccine saga reminds 
us that not all the work published in peer-reviewed journals has actually passed 
reviewers’ scrutiny—and that not all the “authors” of an article may know what’s 
actually in it.
And then—the last example I have room for—there’s the debacle known in 
the U.S. as “Climategate.”41 Those of us in the humanities and the social sciences 
are painfully aware that in our fields peer review can be incompetent, distorted by 
the influence of cliques, or even outright corrupt. For us, the discovery of thousands 
of e-mails from well-established climate scientists conspiring to exclude dissenters’ 
work from the journals,42 though very disappointing, wasn’t altogether shocking. 
The scientific peer-review process is, probably, a somewhat better quality-control 
mechanism than, say, the philosophical peer-review process, but it too is vulnerable 
to corruption; and the danger is most acute in an area where passions run high, as 
they do in climate science.
To be sure, that there were efforts to suppress dissent from the prevailing 
view of global warming and its causes doesn’t show that this view is false. Neither, 
however, does the fact that several inquiries43 (or perhaps “inquiries”)44 into the af-
fair reached reassuring conclusions show that the prevailing view is true. I struggled 
with an article by a professor of meteorology at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology: “the potential ... for alarm enters with the issue of climate sensitivity 
...., the change that a doubling of CO2 will produce in the GATA” [globally aver-
aged temperature anomaly]; but “the quality of the data is poor, ... and because 
36 Brian Deer, “Revealed: MMR Research Scandal,” Times Online (London), February 22, 2004, http://www.
timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article1027636.ece (last visited January 27, 2011).
37 Brian Deer, “How the Case Against the MMR Vaccine was Fixed,” British Medical Journal, 342, 2011: 77-82.
38 Andy Coghlan, “Banned: Doctor Who Linked MMR Vaccine with Autism,” The New Scientist, 18, May 24, 
2010: 18.
39 Editors of The Lancet, “Retraction—Ileal-lymphoid-nodular Hyperplasia, Non-specific Colitis, and Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder in Children,” The Lancet, 375, 2010: 445.
40 Paul A. Offit, “Junk Science Isn’t a Victimless Crime,” Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2011, A17.
41 Because, since the Nixon-era Watergate scandal (named after the building in which the shenanigans took 
place), “gate” has become a generic word for “scandal”—as in “zippergate,” referring to the scandal over Bill 
Clinton and Monica Lewinsky.
42 Keith Johnson, “Climate Strife Comes to Light,” Wall Street Journal, November 23, 2009, A3.
43 See Jeffrey Ball and Guy Chazan, “Report Backs Climate Data, Scolds Scientists,” Wall Street Journal, July 
8, 2010, A13. 
44 See Patrick J. Michaels, “The Climategate Whitewash Continues,” Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2010, A15.
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the changes are small, it is easy to nudge such data a few tenths of a degree in 
any direction”; “the question remains as to whether water vapor or clouds have 
positive or negative feedbacks”; etc., etc.45 I picked up a few words of pidgin Taga-
log in the process, but soon realized I don’t know enough of the relevant science 
to understand Prof. Lindgren’s argument adequately, or to form even a tentative 
opinion of my own. This is especially disturbing because I really don’t know, either, 
whether those hacked e-mails indicated a comparatively small problem with a few 
over-zealous scientists, or were symptomatic of a much more troubling, systemic 
problem. Qua epistemologist, I can’t help wishing that this field were—well, if you’ll 
pardon the pun, less heated.
But can’t we, by now, at least be sure that vaccines and breast implants are 
harmless? We can be confident that the supposed evidence of a connection between 
silicone breast-implants and connective-tissue disorders was flimsy; but it doesn’t 
follow that breast implants carry no dangers. In fact, just as I was writing this paper 
the FDA issued a warning that, in a very few cases, breast implants may be linked 
with a rare form of cancer.46 We can be confident that the supposed evidence of 
a connection between MMR vaccine, bowel disorders, and autism was fraudulent; 
but again, it doesn’t follow that vaccines carry no dangers. We know they do: e.g., 
in 1976 the U.S. had to halt a massive program of vaccinations against swine flu 
because of a significant increase in cases of Guillian-Barré syndrome among those 
recently vaccinated.47  
Indeed, the discovery of Wakefield’s fraud doesn’t even show that there is no 
connection between vaccines and autism. The number of children diagnosed with 
autism has risen over a period in which more comprehensive childhood vaccinations 
have become routine; and some scientists conjecture that the mercury in thimiserol (a 
compound used to preserve vaccines) may be implicated. In 2004, the U.S. Institute 
of Medicine concluded that this idea was “to date, ... theoretical only”48—there was 
no evidence to warrant it. But controversy still simmers; especially since 2007, when, 
granting Hannah Poling’s parents compensation from the federal vaccine injury fund, 
the U.S. government acknowledged that thimiserol had contributed indirectly to 
the child’s autism by exacerbating an underlying mitochondrial disorder.49   
Here too passions run high, both among those alarmed that the rate of vac-
cination against childhood diseases may fall so low as to threaten new epidemics, 
and among those alarmed by what seems to be a significant rise in the rate of 
autism. If I had to guess, I’d say there might be a danger to a few children with 
special susceptibilities. (And if I had to decide whether to have my child vaccinated, 
I might ask for single-dose vaccine, without preservatives, just in case.) But all I 
really know is that I don’t know enough even to be sure how much of the appar-
ent increase in the rate of autism is an illusion attributable to the adoption of an 
ampler definition that now includes a broad range of “autism-spectrum disorders”; 
let alone whether, if there is a significant real increase, what the evidence might 
eventually indicate about its cause(s). In short, again I don’t know enough to be 
entitled to an opinion. 
45 Richard S. Lindgren, “The Climate Science Isn’t Settled,” Wall Street Journal, December 1, 2009, A19. 
46 Jennifer Corbett Dooren and Alicia Mundy, “Implants, Cancer May be Linked,” Wall Street Journal, January 
27, 2011, A6.
47 David A. Freeman and Philip B. Stark, “The Swine Flu Vaccine and Guillain-Barré Syndrome: A Case Study in 
Relative Risk and Specific Causation,” Law and Contemporary Problems, 64.4, 2001: 49-62, p. 52.
48 National Institute of Medicine, Immunization Safety Review, Washington, D.C., 2004, p. 152.
49 Thomas L. Hofmeister, “Government Agrees to Compensate Family that Claims Childhood Vaccinations Caused 
Autism,” Developments in Mental Health Law, 27, 2008: 71-3. Three other test cases decided in 2009 held 
that the evidence showed neither that MMR vaccine causes autism, nor that thimiserol does. 
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And now I’m back where I began—with Rumsfeld’s “unknown unknowns.” 
So here, at last, is my take on his epistemological point. To assess how good the 
evidence was that, e.g., Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, U.S. 
intelligence services needed to know not only where the available evidence [the 
“knowns”] pointed, and how secure it was, but also how comprehensive it was; and 
to do that, they needed to know what relevant evidence there might be that they 
didn’t have [the “unknowns”]. Unfortunately, though they knew what some of the 
relevant evidence was that they needed but didn’t have [the “known unknowns”], 
they didn’t realize that other evidence, evidence they also didn’t have, was also 
relevant [the “unknown unknowns”]. There is a lesson here for us all.50
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